Back in the age when decentralized social protocol enthusiasts roamed Farcaster protocol[^1], people reasoned out loud about the benefits of cryptographic guarantees for verifiable messages.
It was more than a fun mental exercise! People built tools, e.g., here and here, to re-sign messages in case an account got hacked.
This was seen as a vast improvement on web2-style social media, especially X, where project accounts are notoriously hard to secure. Crypto project accounts seem to get hacked with regularity[^2], and reputable projects must rely on front- and back-channels within X, in order to arbitrate between competing actors bearing valid credentials. Much better to have decentralized methods to handle things, using the power of cryptography!
As far as I can tell, no one has actually deleted all their signers and observed how the Farcaster network would handle it. All known cases have involved (A) deleting secondary signers (not primary ones), or (B) asking Merkle team to handle ...
